Problems in the Regulation of Tender Offers: The Williams Act, State Takeover Statutes, and SEC Rules by Hull, Everette D.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 13 Issue 3 
1978 
Problems in the Regulation of Tender Offers: The Williams Act, 
State Takeover Statutes, and SEC Rules 
Everette D. Hull 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Everette D. Hull, Problems in the Regulation of Tender Offers: The Williams Act, State Takeover Statutes, 
and SEC Rules, 13 Tulsa L. J. 552 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol13/iss3/5 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
Notes & Comments
PROBLEMS IN THE REGULATION OF TENDER
OFFERS: THE WILLIAMS ACT, STATE
TAKEOVER STATUTES, AND SEC
RULES
I. INTRODUCTION
Problems have developed in the interpretation of the various regu-
lations of tender offer takeover bids. Such tender offers are described as
"publicly made invitations addressed to all shareholders of a corpora-
tion to tender their shares for sale at a specified price,"' and are regu-
lated by federal and state statutes, and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) guidelines. Confusion in the regulation of tender
offers has stemmed from the varied application of such regulations2
and from recent court decisions relating to takeover bids.' This con-
fused state of the various regulatory guidelines has been magnified by
the increased use of tender offers, now one of the most popular ways of
taking over a company.4
1. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 936-37 (3d ed. 1972). The consider-
ation offered may be cash or other securities. Id The terms "cash tender offer" and "exchange
tender offer" (or "exchange offer") are generally used to distinguish between the different forms of
consideration. See, e.g., Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities
Regulation, 41 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 499, 500-02 (1967); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender
Offer" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 nn.7 & 8 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as "Tender Offer" under the SEA. of 1934]; cf ALl FED. SEC. CODE §§ 299.9
(Tent. Draft Nos. 1-3, 1974) (using the term "tender request").
2. See Securities & Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 14(d)-(e) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e)
(1976)). Sections 14(d) and 14(e) were originally enacted as parts of the Williams Act, Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(O(1976)); see also Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390, codified at
15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
3. See Wilner & Landy, The Tender-Trap. State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Winer & Landy,
Tender-Trap], which discusses the various state takeover statutes. See also Great Western United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
4. See Appelton, The Proposed S.E.C. Tender Offer Rules, 32 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1381 (1977),
reporting that "in fiscal 1970 there were only 34 [tender offers]." But see E. ARANOW, H. BIN-
HORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL Vi (1977)
1
Hull: Problems in the Regulation of Tender Offers: The Williams Act, St
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1977
1978] TENDER OFFER REGULATION
The tender offer takeover bid and its proclivity to squeeze out mi-
nority shareholders of the target company may be the most important
corporate law issue of current concern because of the number of Amer-
ican and European companies jumping into the takeover market, the
enormous dollar amounts which are usually involved in a tender of-
fer,5 and the confusion which exists in their regulation.
This article will discuss current problems in interpreting the regu-
lations which attempt to control tender offer takeover bids in light of
[hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS], showing that the rate of recent tender
offer filings is increasing, as follows:
Year Tender Offer Filings




1977 (first 4 months) 50
5. A recent discussion of the growing number of corporate chieftains that are shopping for
merger and acquisition possibilities through the use of a takeover bid appears in the WALL ST. J.,
April 11, 1978, at 1, col. 6, and states that:
In 1977, there were 41 transactions valued at $100 million or more, up from 39 in 1976
and only I1 in 1975. .... Last year, 193 merger proposals were made to publicly held
compames, excluding 74 offers that later were canceled, up 18% from 1976 and the high-
est total since the merger binge of the late 1960s ....
But the big transactions are only part of the activity. The vast majority of the 2,224
mergers and acquisitions last year were purchases of small businesses or divisions that
the large company buyers think will speed up the rate of earnings growth.
With hundreds of U.S. companies seeking acquisitions to speed their profit growth,
and more foreign buyers jumping into the market, the takeover wave has pushedup the
asking price for many pnvately held concerns, and is sparking bidding contests for pub-
licly traded merger targets. Sellers are prospering, but some buyers are paying prices that
may make it hard to get the expected rate of return on investment ....
6. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
(1973); F. O'NEAL, SQUEEZE-OUTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975) [hereinafter cited as F.
O'NEAL]; DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4; Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and
Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAw. 149 (1966); Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, THE REV. OF SEC. REG. 853 (1976); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry
into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973); Griffin &
Tucker, The WilliamsAct Public Law 90-439-Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to
the Williams Act, 16 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1971); Gurry, Aspects of the Law of Contract in Relation
to Takeover Offers, 50 AUST. L. J. 167 (1976); Hayes & Taussig, The Tactics of Cash Takeover
Bids, 45 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hayes & Taussig]; Lipton, Review of
Tender Offers for Corporate Control, 72 MICH. L. REV. 358 (1973); Shipman, Some Thoughts
About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: the Ohio TakeoverAct, 21 CASE WEST. RES. L. REV.
722 (1970); Wilner & Landy, Tender-Trap, supra note 3; A.B.A. National Institute, Corporate
Takeovers-The Unfriendly Tender Offer and the Minority Stockholder Freezeout, 32 Bus. LAW.
1443 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Takeover]; Note, The Second Circuit adopts a Business
Purpose Test for Going Private: Marshel v. A.F W Fabric Corp. and Green v. Santa Fe Industries,
Inc., 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1184 (1976); Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Fed-
eral Securities Law: A New Challengefor Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CRI. L. REV. 359 (1966); Note, Tender
Offer Regulation-Injunction Standards Under the Williams Act, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 51 (1976);
Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders from Freezeouts Through Merger, 22 WAYNE L.
REV. 1421 (1976); "Tender Offer" under the SEA. of 1934, supra note 1.
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the conflicts between state and federal regulations. Recent case law
dealing with the standing to sue of parties to a tender offer contest, and
the possibility of federal preemption of state takeover statutes will also
be discussed. Finally, the future use of the tender offer as a corporate
takeover technique will be analyzed in a review of proposed SEC
Tender Offer Rules.
II. USE OF A TENDER OFFER BID AND THE NEED FOR
REGULATION
There are a number of ways by which an individual or a corpora-
tion can acquire control of another corporation. Among these are the
proxy method, the stock-for-stock exchange offer, and the cash tender
offer or "takeover bid." The first method, which involves the solicita-
tion of proxies by the person or group interested in gaining control
from the stockholders of the target corporation, will not be considered
in this article.7 The second method is an offer by an outsider to take
stock from all or some of the target company's stockholders in ex-
change for the stock or other securities of the offeror. Such an offeror
may be either an individual or a corporation, and the exchange may be
for part securities and part cash.8 The third way of acquiring control of
the target corporation is to make a tender offer for sufficient shares of
stock of the target company to insure voting control, and agree to pay
cash to those stockholders who tender their shares.9 This is the conven-
tional use of a tender offer as an acquisition technique. Although the
tender offer was used in the 1960's primarily as a means by which a
corporation could repurchase its own securities rather than as a method
of taking over another company, today it is the most significant corpo-
rate takeover weapon, and has supplanted the proxy contest.' 0
The second and third methods of acquiring control mentioned
above are best illustrated by an analysis of a hypothetical tender con-
test where control of target company, T, is being sought by two tender
offerors, Aand B.
7. For consideration of the proxy method, see Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 906, 909 nn.4 & 6
(1971).
8. Id
9. The respective advantages and disadvantages, as well as the mechanics of these three
methods, are discussed extensively in several articles, See, e.g., Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids
and Corporate Purchases of Stock, supra note 6, at 149; Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acqus-
tion by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1967); Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take.over
Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967); see also VI Loss, SECuTIEs REGULATION 3655
(Vol. 3, 2d ed. Supp.).
10. "Tender Offer" under the S.E.A. of 1934, supra note 1, at 1253.
[Vol. 13:552
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T is controlled principally by members of one family, who own
thirty percent of the outstanding stock. Offeror A attempts to secure
voting control of T through cash and exchange tender offers for Ts
common stock. Meanwhile, a new offeror, B, enters the picture also
seeking to gain control of T, but with the support of those presently in
control. The struggle begins when A makes cash purchases of common
stock of 7. At first, A is able to acquire only a small percentage of the
outstanding shares, and therefore A announces a cash tender offer at a
premium price. 7's management opposes offeror A's tender offer, and
after so advising its stockholders by letter, sells authorized but unissued
stock to a third party, thus increasing the amount of stock necessary for
offeror A to secure control. Offeror A continues to acquire shares of
stock.
While offeror A's tender offer is pending, the family sells thirty
percent of its stock to favored offeror B, but at an inflated price. At the
conclusion of both offers, offeror B owns a total of forty-five percent of
T stock while offeror A has only forty percent, with fifteen percent re-
maining in the hands of the public.
As the price of the stock continues to rise, offeror A eventually
gives up the takeover attempt having paid top dollar for non-control-
ling shares. There has been a year-long battle for control, and B has
also been forced to pay an increased price for the shares required to
gain control. Offeror A, when it appears the battle for control is lost,
sues T, alleging that B gained control of the target corporation as a
result of violations of federal securities laws. If B had lost, the same
allegation in a suit against Twould probably be made. If Thad been in
danger of losing control of its shares to the undesirable offeror, A, then
a suit to enjoin the takeover by offeror A would probably have ensued.
Hence, the term "tender contest" is employed. Many suits, such as
those above, arise out of bids to take over another company.
This hypothetical tender contest illustrates the problems the par-
ties to such a contest face when more than one bid for control of the
target company is made, or when the takeover is fought by the target
company. The parties involved must confront the issue of whom the
regulations are meant to protect in such a contest, and who has stand-
ing to bring suit under federal or state regulations. Some of the other
complexities which must be analyzed in such situations include time
constraints placed upon the takeover attempt, the effect of delay from
adherence to regulations such as disclosure requirements, and the prac-
1978]
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tical effects of the uncertainties generated by regulatory constaints
placed upon tender offers.
Despite these obvious difficulties afflicting the parties to a tender
contest, the number of quality companies which are willing to consider
a proposition of corporate takeover through the use of a tender offer
continues to grow. " This is especially true where the cash tender offer
is compared to alternative methods of changing a company's structure,
such as corporate merger or acquisition.' 2 More popular uses of the
tender offer include the takeover of: (1) a potential target company with
weak management, (2) a company with widespread stock ownership
where there is no large family block or no stock in management bonds,
(3) a company where stock is widely and freely traded with a good deal
of liquidity, (4) a company with little debt or one that is earning money
but selling at a reasonably low price-earnings ratio, or (5) a company
with tangible book value assets of a non-technological nature that may
be managed without expertise. 3
The tender offer may be used to purchase all of a company's out-
standing shares, or simply enough shares to give the purchaser control.
The purchaser may or may not attempt to buy the shares of minority
holders, yet the majority shareholders may get a handsome premium
for their shares. However, when the latter event occurs, several theories
have been used to require majority sellers to share the premium price
received for their controlling shares or to pay damages to the minority
shareholders.14 Liability to minority shareholders under such theories
may result if misrepresentation, breach of a fiduciary duty, sale of a
corporate office, circumvention of corporate action, or diversion of a
corporate opportunity has occurred in the takeover.' A seller of con-
trol through a tender offer must therefore confront the problem that
such control may be considered a corporate asset, and any premium
paid for that control should go to the corporation's treasury.' 6 The right
to a special profit simply as a price paid to the controlling shareholders
for relinquishing control has also been theorized. 7 But the fact that this
11. Flom, The Role of the Takeover in the American Economy, 32 Bus. LAW. 1299, 1300
(1977).
12. Corporate Takeovers, supra note 6, at 1299.
13. See id.
14. See F. O'NEaL, supra note 6, § 4.04 at 189-98 & 1977 Supp., at 12.
15. Id. at 190.
16. Id at 198, See also Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 31, 38-39 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Jennings].
17. See Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173, 178, which states:
We do not mean to suggest that a majority stockholder cannot dispose of his controlling
[Vol. 13:552
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control is the holder's ability to dominate property which in equity also
belongs to others, including minority shareholders, causes many minor-
ity freeze-out problems. 8 Subsequent discussion will evaluate whom
the tender offer regulations attempt to protect, the conflict among vari-
ous sources of regulation which purport to control the use of tender
offers, and the feasibility of continued use of the tender offer as a cor-
porate takeover technique.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF TENDER
OFFERS
The tender offer has become in increasingly popular device for
taking control of a corporation away from present management.' 9 As a
result, in 1968 Congress passed the Williams Act,2" which extends the
disclosure and antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 to protect investors suddenly confronted by a tender offer.2'
Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act, a shareholder was often
forced to make a hasty decision, although he was unaware of the iden-
tity of the prospective purchaser, its plans for the company upon gain-
ing control, or its financial ability to carry out its program.22 These
block of stock to outsiders without having to account to his corporation for profits or
even never do this with impunity when the buyer is an interested customer, actual or
potential, for the corporation's product. But when the sale necessarily results in a sacri-
lice of this element of corporate good will and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary
who has caused the sacrifice, he should account for his gains. So in a time of market
shortage, where a call on a corporation's product commands an unusually large pre-
mium, in one form or another, we think it sound law that a fiduciary may not appropri-
ate to himself the value of this premium. Such personal gain at the expense of his
coventurers seems particularly reprehensible when made by the trusted president and
director of his company.
See also Jennings, supra note 16, at 38; North & Co. v. Huffmes, 416 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2d Cir.
1969).
18. F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 3.10, at 107.
19. See the chart at note 5, supra, showing the annual increase in use of tender offers for the
years 1973-1977. See also DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 6, at vi.
20. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 2, 3, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78n(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1976)).
21. The following cases indicate that a major purpose of the Williams Act is the protection of
investors: Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 53 (1977) (Stevens J. & Brennan J.
dissent); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th
Cir. 1974); Wulc v. Gulf & W. Ind., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 99 (E.D Pa. 1975); Texasgulf, Inc. v.
Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F.
Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
22. Before 1968, the cash tender offeror was under no obligation to supply relevant informa-
tion to the shareholders whom it solicited. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 521; see also Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition
by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 326 (1967); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REy.
377, 380 (1969). However, other takeover devices previously had been reached by federal disclo-
sure requirements. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 521, 523. An exchange offer, since it entails an issuance of the offeror's own
6
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concerns posed a threat to the shareholders' accrued equity ownership
in stock.
Section 14(d) of the Williams Act 2 3 requires a tender offeror seek-
ing to acquire more than five percent2 4 of any class of equity security to
make an advance disclosure of specific information about the tender
offer directly to the shareholders at the time the offer is announced.25
This section is intended to provide the offeree shareholders an opportu-
nity to make a well-informed decision.2 6 In addition, section 13(d) of
the Act27provides that a person who, by any means, has acquired more
than a five percent interest in any equity security must, within ten days,
make a similar disclosure.2 8 This is an after-the-fact disclosure in con-
trast to the restrictions on proposed takeovers in section 14(d). Finally,
section 14(e) of the Act29 prohibits all persons from making "untrue
statement[s] [or misleading omissions, and from] engag[ing] in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. . . practices. . . in connection
with any tender offer."" °
The Williams Act has been considered an attempt to remove the
advantage of surprise in the tender offer takeover technique 31 through
its requirement of a comprehensive advance disclosure by those mak-
securities, is subject to the formidable anti-fraud and disclosure provisions of the Securities Act.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(d), 77k, 771(2)(1976) (anti-fraud); S.E.C. Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1977)
(registration statement, disclosure); See also I A. BROMBERG, SECURMTES LAW § 6.2, at 400
(1975).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1976).
24. The designation of five percent of any class of equity security under 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1976) and 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976), as opposed to the ten percent designation which appears
in the original Act, S. 510, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(d)(1), 3(d)(1), reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code &
Ad News 521, 523, appears to be somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, the effect of a tender offer is
the same at five percent as it is at ten percent of a class of stock.
25. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l(c) (1977). The Act also requires that such advance disclosures
be made to the S.E.C. and to the issuer of the securities-the target corporation.
26. The Act was "designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors." S.
REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S CODE & AD. NEWS 521.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976). See alsol7 C.F.R. §240.13d-1 to 13d-101 (1977).
28. This provision covers both open market and negotiated purchases of shares and requires
the preparation and filing of S.E.C. Schedule 13D. Schedule 13D requires the purchaser to set
forth, inter alia, his identity and background, his means of financing the acquisitions the purpose
of the transactions and, if he seeks working control of the issuer, his plans upon successful comple-
tion of the takeover. See Schedule 13D, 17 C.F R. § 240.13d-101 (1977). These disclosures must be
made to the issuer, the S.E.C., and the exchanges where the security is traded. 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)(1) (1976).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
30. Id. This provision is broader in scope than are the general anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, which protect only purchasers and sellers of securities. Compare 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976) with 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) (Rule lOb-5). "In effect [section 14(e)] applies
Rule lOb-5 both to the offeror and to the opposition. ... Electronic Specialty Co. v. Interna-
tional Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1969); see Bromberg, The Securities Law of
Tender offers, 15 N.Y.L. F. 462, 471 (1969).
31. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 6, at 137.
7
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ing a tender offer.32 The Act has also been viewed as serving an overall
congressional purpose of closing the "gap" in takeover attempt disclo-
sure by providing shareholders with substantial and timely disclosure
whenever shares are being acquired in what might be a potential take-
over situation. 3 However, a close examination of the original bi, 34
proposed by Senator Williams, reveals some confusion as to whom this
Act purports to protect: the minority shareholders, the management of
the target company, potential investors, or all participants in the tender
contest. Senator Williams explained the purposes of the bill as follows:
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the
scales equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corpora-
don, management, and shareholders without impeding cash
takeover bids. Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the
balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in
favor of the offeror. The purpose of this bill is to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the
same time providing the offeror and management equal oppor-
tunity to fairly present their case ...
This bill will put all on an equal footing with respect to the
availability of significant facts about a tender offer. . . . All
will be able to deal in the securities markets knowing that all
the pertinent facts are available.35
The Williams Act has indeed given a substantial amount of pro-
tection to minority shareholders in the tender contests which have oc-
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person. . . to make a tender offer for, or a request or invita-
tion for tenders of, any class of any equity security. . . if, after consummation thereof,
such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner of more than 5 per
centum of such class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request or invitation are
first published or sent or given to security holders such person has filed with the Com-
mission a statement containing such of the information specified in section 13(d) of this
title ....
As written, the statute anticipates that one must first classify a transaction as a tender offer before
one determines (by reference to the five percent condition) whether the disclosure requirement
will apply.
33. "Tender Offer" under the S.E4. of 1934, supra note 6, at 1257 n.41.
34. S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 521.
35. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,3; H. R. REP., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,4, 113
CONG. REC. 854, 856, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE & AD. NEwS 2811, 2813; See also Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 67-68 (1977) (Stevens J., dissenting), where Stevens states that:
F rotection of tender offerors is not only consistent with protection of shareholders...
It is indispensable to protecting shareholders. . . . Thus, the most realistic deterrent to
fraud on shareholders is a damages suit brought by the opposition in the tender contest.
Moreover, disallowing such suits creates an incentive to violate the Act in retaliation for
violations by the other side. When no effective judicial remedy is available, self help is
more attractive. Finally, a damages remedy for the tender offeror is necessary for the
protection of one particular class of shareholders: those shareholders of target corpora-
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curred since its enactment,36 and the current trend is toward more
scrutiny of tender offers in order to prevent minority freeze-outs. 37
Prior to the Williams Act, stockholders who were confronted with
tender offers for their stock usually had to rely on their own ingenuity
and resources in determining the merits of an offer, since the offeror
was not bound to, and often did not, disclose all the facts which the
offerees needed or wanted to know in deciding whether to accept or
reject the offer.38 But since the passage of the Act, courts have also
allowed the Act to be asserted as a shield to protect against unwanted
tender offers.39 Such a position by the courts has provided protection
for shareholders' management and investors.
The first case attempting to ascertain which group the Williams
Act purported to protect came in the form of a judicial expansion of the
meaning of the term "tender offer." In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v.
Fears,' a coordinated series of negotiated purchases from a large num-
ber of shareholders during a relatively short period of time was held to
constitute a tender offer for purposes of sections 14(d) and 14(e). 41 The
district court argued that a "remedial statute" like the Williams Act
should be "interpreted liberally" to fulfill the purposes of Con-
gress,42which included disclosure of material information concerning
"any effort to acquire control," and relief of pressure on shareholders
to make hurried decisions "as to whether to dispose of or retain their
securities. 43 Specifically, the court stated that the purpose of Congress
in passing the Act was clearly
36. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Dona-
hue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
37. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); see also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969
(Del. Super. 1977); DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at 286, 297 nn.73 & 74, 298
n.112, 299 nn.116 & 117, 300 nn.132 & 133; F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, at iv (1977 Cum. Supp.).
38. See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970);
Hamilton, Some Relections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969). See
generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 906, 910 (1971).
39. See Aranow, Einhom & Berlstein, Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations of the Williams
Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 1755 (1977) (adapted from E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN,
TENDER OFFERS (1977) [hereinafter cited as Aranow, Standing to Sue]). See also Comment,
Tender Offers: The Liberalization o/Standing Requirements Under Section 14(e), 7 U.S.F.L. R.V,
561 (1973).
40. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972), vacatedper stipulation, No. C72-152 (W.D.Okla.,
May 8, 1972), noted in 1972 DUKE L.J. 1051. See also "Tender Offer" under the S.E.A. of 1934,
supra note I, at 1263-66.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), § 78n(e) (1976). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-e (1977).
42. 343 F. Supp. at 251 (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), and Marriott
v. National Mut. Cas. Co., 195 F.2d 462, 466 (10th Cir. 1952)).
43. 343 F. Supp. at 1251.
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to provide investors who hold equity interests in public corpo-
rations material information with respect to the potential im-
pact of any effort to acquire control of a company, sufficient
time within which to make an unhurried investment decision
as to whether to dispose of or retain their securities, and to
assure fair treatment of the investors.44
The classes of investors who were intended to benefit from the
tender offer legislation is open to an interpretation which would in-
clude both majority and minority shareholders, and would also encom-
pass the management of the target company who might seek to avoid
an unwanted takeover bid. Therefore, the groundwork is present for
the use of the Williams Act by any participant in a tender contest to
prevent any other participant from achieving an unwanted takeover of
the target company, if proper information has not been filed with the
SEC as required.45
In .J Z Case Co. v. Borak,46 the United States Supreme Court held
that a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation could be brought
under section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,47 al-
though it seems clear that the primary beneficiaries of that section were
intended to be individual stockholders rather than corporations. 48 The
rationale given was that authorizing individual shareholders to bring
an action for rescission or damages for a violation of section 14(a) was
essential for the protection of investors.49 Although Borak was a proxy
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. The information required by 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(A)-(E) (1976) to be filed with the S.E.C.
in reference to tender offers includes the following: (1) the identity and background of persons on
whose behalf the purchases are being made; (2) the source and amount of funds to be used and a
description of financing arrangements; (3) the purposes of the purchase, and if one such purpose is
to acquire control, a description of plans or proposals relating to any major change in the com-
pany; and (4) any contracts, arrangements, or understanding with respect to any of the securities
to be acquired.
The Rule has additional provisions designed to afford further protection to a tender
offeree. For example, it gives a ri ht of withdrawal of tendered shares for seven days
after the first publication or transmssion of the tender offer and at any time after 60 days
from the date of the original offer, provides for pro rata acceptance of securities tendered
within the first ten days of the offer (where more securities have been deposited than the
tender offeror is bound to take up); and requires that any increase in the tender price
shall be paid to all persons whose securities are taken up. Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears,
343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976).
46. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
48. The purpose of §14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization
for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosures in a proxy solication, thus
protecting the stockholder first and foremost. Such a purpose is to control the conditions under
which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which frustrate
the free exercise of the voting rights of the stockholders. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
427 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1934).
49. 377 U.S. at 426.
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contest rather than a tender offer contest, its rationale has been argued
to be equally applicable so as to give a tender offeror who is also a
shareholder-investor a position within the class protected by tender of-
fer legislation." However, in the recent Supreme Court opinion, Piper
v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc.,"t the purpose of the Williams Act was
held to be the protection of investors who are confronted with a tender
offer,5 2 without including a private cause of action for damages by one
of several contending offerors against a successful bidder or by a losing
contender against the target corporation. 53 The Piper case suggests the
possibility of applying the Williams Act not only to minority share-
holders in a tender contest target company, but also to the rival contes-
tants for control.5 4 In denying standing to the tender offeror to claim
damages for statutory violations, the majority of the Court in Piper
indicated that the Williams Act was not intended to benefit tender of-
ferors, but only the shareholder-offerees. 5 'This conclusion is not en-
tirely supported by the language of Senator Williams, who stated that
the purpose of his bill was "to protect the legitimate interests of the
corporation, management, and shareholders without impeding cash
takeover bids."56
The Piper ruling that a tender offeror does not have standing
under the Williams Act to bring suit for damages against a competing
tender offeror or against the target corporation is contrary to virtually
all prior decisions, which gave unquestioned standing to every inter-
ested party to a tender offer.57 Several earlier court decisions had
specifically given tender offerors standing to sue under the Williams
50. See Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 55 (1977) (Stevens, J. and Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
51. 430 U.S. 1 (1977); see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
52. 430 U.S. at 25.
53. Id
54. Id
55. 430 U.S. at 26; see also Cort v. Ash, 426 U.S. 66 (1975).
56. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE & AD. NEws 21.
57. See Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Atkiengesellschaft, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.), aj'gper cur/am,
370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Welling-
ton Assoc., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973); H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st
Cir. 1973); Gulf& W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); Butler
Aviation Int'l Indus. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Otis Elevator
Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal,
403 F. Supp. 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 1975); D-Z Inv. Co. v. Holloway [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 94-771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366
F.Supp. 374 (S.D.Tex. 1973); MGM v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(cases giving a target company's management standing to sue for injunctive relief). See
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Act.5"
It seems clear from the Court's discussion of the legislative history
of the Williams Act that the Court believed only shareholder-offerees,
not tender offerors or target corporations, were those for whose special
benefit the Act was adopted. 9 However, even though there is no spe-
cific legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to so limit
standing to sue for damages, the standing of every party to a tender
offer to bring suit under the Williams Act had been virtually unques-
tioned until the Piper decision.60 Therefore, with the standing issue
somewhat unsettled because of the questions left unanswered by
Piper,6 1 it is somewhat premature to expect certainty with respect to
precisely which parties are to be given standing to sue under the Wil-
liams Act. Additionally, the relief to which those parties will be enti-
tled, and under what circumstances, remains unclear.62
Even though Piper has restricted the offeror's standing to sue, it
may be interpreted as leaving a right for offerors to seek injunctive re-
lief against misstatements made by the target's management.63 Such re-
lief for an offeror, unlike an award of money damages, is fully
58. Eg., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974); H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Emhart
Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir.
1975).
59. 430 U.S. at 35.
60. See Aranow, Standing to Sue, supra note 39, at 1755. Only two court decisions had held
that standing to sue was restricted where tender contest participants were concerned. See Applied
Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [19771 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,824 (broad
standing to sue); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863
(broad standing to sue). Cf. Kaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975) (restricting
standing); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974) (restricting standing). In neither
Kaus nor Sargent, however, were there harmful misrepresentations to the protected shareholders.
In Kau, the tender offeror was the one misled, and in Sargent, the issue was actually whether the
offeror had violated any duties it had toward the plaintiff shareholder. But see Piper v. Chris Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying standing to sue to an offeror).
61. Piper leaves the question of who has standing to sue under the Williams Act somewhat
open when it held merely that tender offerors do not have standing. See430 U.S. 1,55 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
62. Aranow, Standing to Sue, supra note 39, at 1769.
63. See Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 2416 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1978).
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that tender offerors have
standing to seek injunctive relief against competing tender offerors and against the target com-
pany's management for violation of the provisions of the Williams Act. Misrepresentations con-
cerning the original tender offer, which the target's management opposed, and a competing offer
approved by management, justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Management
breached its obligation to furnish its shareholders with all information it had so that the share-
holders could intelligently decide between the two competing offers. Shareholders are likely to
rely heavily on management as corporate insiders, the court indicated, and management's failure
to fulfill its responsibilities justified the injunction against misrepresentations concerning both of-
fers. See also Aranow, Standing to Sue, supra note 39, at 1760; Note, Tender Offer Regulation-
Injunction Standards Under the Williams Act, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 51 (1976).
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consistent with the underlying purposes of the Williams Act and is not
detrimental to the interests of the target's shareholders. In Piper, the
Supreme Court stated that "the Williams Act cannot consistently be
interpreted as conferring a monetary remedy upon regulated parties,
particularly where the award would not redound to the direct benefit of
the protected class."6 4 This language would not restrict the right to in-
junctive relief for the offeror seeking to enforce the requirements of the
Williams Act. Further, the target's shareholders would be protected,
and the purposes of the Act would be served by insuring that the share-
holders could evaluate both the tender offer and the opposition to it
based upon accurate statements of all material facts. Unlike a damage
award, a grant of injunctive relief would not harm either the sharehold-
ers who tendered their shares, or those who did not.65
Although Piper raises some questions as to the standing of any
party other than shareholders in a tender contest, regardless of the re-
lief sought, tender offerors' standing to seek injunctive relief is essential
to insure that shareholders receive complete and accurate information
concerning tender offers from the management of the target as well as
from the offeror. Practically speaking, the tender offeror is the only
party likely to be able to seek relief in order to protect the target's
64. 430 U.S. at 28.
65. Injunctive relief has been recognized in a series of cases beginning with Electronic Spe-
cialty Co. v. International Control Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 944-46 (2d Cir. 1969) (target companies
held to have standing to seek injunctive relief under sections 14(d) and 14(e), where materially
violated). However, guidelines for asserting injunctive relief have been set in a series of related
cases. In Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973), a prelimi-
nary injunction was issued where the plaintiff had made a strong showing of irreparable harm, but
had not clearly demonstrated probable success on the merits. Conversely, where a strong showing
of probable success has been made, the plaintiff need show only the possibility of irreparable
harm. Id at 250; Checkers Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Dino DeLaurentis Cinematografica, S.P.A. v. D-150, Inc., 366 F.2d
373, 375 (2d Cir. 1966); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Bemus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir.
1953). A number of cases, however, have suggested that a tender offer that violates the Williams
Act is "unlawful" and probably should be enjoined with little or no direct discussion of irrepara-
ble harm. See Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973)
(requiring that only a probable material violation be shown); ef. Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc,, 360
F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973) (preliminary relief justified by threatened irreparable harm to the
target plaintifi). See also General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). More recently, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) reaffirmed
the need for a showing of irreparable harm as a prerequisite for injunctive relief to a private
litigant, but did not directly address the issue of materiality espoused in Electronic Specialty Co.
Cases after Mosinee have followed a somewhat less strict test for granting injunctive relief. See
Stecher-Traung-Schmidt Corp. v. Self, 529 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (issuance of a
preliminary injunction, at the behest of the target, of a potential takeover bid where the plaintiff
had shown merely a likelihood of sustaining irreparable damage). An even greater departure from
the strict interpretation of Mosinee came in Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F.
Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976), where the court found that merely an interest of the target's share-
holders in receiving full disclosure justified injunctive relief.
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shareholders and himself when the tender contest is at a preliminary
stage where an injunction would be appropriate and where misstate-
ments made by the parties may be corrected or enjoined.
The Tender Offer and the Business Purpose Test
On September 23, 1977, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in Singer
v. Magnavox Co.,66 applied a "business purpose test" in formulating a
rule first utilized in an earlier case67 to evaluate whether a tender offer
action by majority shareholders had as its primary purpose the "freez-
ing out" of a minority interest, without regard to the fairness of the
price. In applying this test, Singer held that the majority stockholders
and management of Magnavox violated their respective ficuciary duties
by their participation in a tender offer to the minority stockholders of
Magnavox, pursuant to a merger with T.M.C. Development Corpora-
tion. The violations occurred when the majority shareholders and the
management agreed to the terms of a tender offer wherein a grossly
inadequate cash price was offered for the shares of Magnavox. The
Court said:
A Delaware Court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a
merger when a freeze-out of minority stockholders on a cash-
out basis is alleged to be its sole purpose. In such a situation,
if it is alleged that the purpose is improper because of the
fiduciary obligation owed to the minority, the Court is duty-
bound to closely examine that allegation even when all of the
relevant statutory formalities have been satisfied.6
The Court in Singer considered an earlier case in which the plain-
tiff shareholder alleged that the dominant shareholder caused the issu-
ance of new shares to impair plaintiffs minority interest and to force
him out of the corporation. 69 The equitable doctrine, whereby corpo-
rate officers, directors, 70 and controlling shareholders7 1 owe the corpo-
ration and its minority shareholders a fiduciary obligation of honesty,
loyalty, good faith and fairness, was applied.72 The legal propriety of
the motives of the controlling stockholders is judged according to this
fiduciary standard. Singer illustrates that evaluation of the propriety of
a tender offer is within the responsibility of a court of equity. Such a
66. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
67. Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236, 239 (Del. Ch. 1953).
68. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
69. Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953).
70. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1939).
71. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. Super. 1952).
72. Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (1953).
1978]
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court will scrutinize corporate acts closely when it is alleged that their
purpose violates the fiduciary duty owed to minority stockholders.73
Those who control the corporate machinery owe a fiduciary duty to the
minority in the exercise of that control, and the use of such power
merely to perpetuate control is a violation of that duty. 4 Singer held
that "[a] merger, made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
shareholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and the complaint,
which so alleges in this suit, states a cause of action for violation of a
fiduciary duty."75 The court went even further and stated that although
a proper business purpose is found to exist, "the fiduciary obligation of
the majority to the minority stockholders remains and proof of a proper
business purpose, without more, will not necessarily discharge it."
76
The concurring opinion in Singer argued that the "business purpose"
test was too vague and that a more concrete test would be to require the
takeover bidder to show a compelling corporate need to "go private.
77
Consideration should be given to the "economic necessity, desirability
and feasibility involved, [the] evidence of self-serving [actions], manip-
ulation, or over-reaching, and all other relevant factors of intrinsic fair-
ness or unfairness.
78
In a March 23, 1977 United States Supreme Court decision, Santa
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,79 the Court also followed the business pur-
pose test and held that in a "going-private" situation,"° where no claim
of misrepresentation was made, no remedy was available to a com-
plaining shareholder under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.8' The share-
73. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977).
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id at 980.
77. In a lecture by Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, given at the Symposium on Minority Share-
holder Squeezeouts, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (Nov. 16, 1977) (transcribed tape recording in Tulsa Law
Library), discussing Singer and the term "going private," Professor O'Neal described the concept
as the reverse of going public. Basically, the company is seeking, through a tender offer, to buy
back its shares at a certain price. Purchases of shares are usually obtained from minority share-
holders and at a premium price so that the corporation may obtain a high percentage of the
shares. The ultimate goal is to get the number of shareholders below 300 so that the company need
no longer adhere to the S.E.C. Act regarding disclosure and registration requirements under 15
U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1976). The minority shareholder is threatened by a squeezeout in this instance
by the lack of protection from the securities laws and by the fact that no public market would
ultimately exist for their shares if retained. What shares the corporation does not obtain through
the tender offer may then be obtained through additional squeezeout procedures such as a reverse
stock split, or by a consolidation of existing shares by amendment of the corporate charter.
78. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d at 982.
79. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
80. For a detailed discussion of "going private," see Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903
(1975).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) (Rule lOb-5),
[Vol. 13:552
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holder in Green claimed that insiders had caused the corporation to
engage in a squeeze-out merger for no valid business purpose but solely
to eliminate minority shareholders. The Court stated that such a share-
holder had to look to state law for any possible remedy. Thus Green
gave a renewed importance to state takeover laws by leaving the re-
sponsibility of governing the internal affairs of corporate life to the
states.82
Current Trend in Tender Offer Regulation by State Takeover Statutes
Several states have recently passed what have come to be known
as takeover statutes. The principal purpose of these statutes is to pro-
vide advance warning to management and shareholders of a tender of-
fer, 3and many of these new laws provide for hearings before the states'
82. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
83. See DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at 207; Royalty, State Takeover
Statutes and New Takeover Strategies-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAw. 1459 (1977); Robinson, Tender
Offers, Some Facts & Fancies (pt.2), 175 N.Y.U.L. REv. 96 (1976); Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap,
supra note 3, at 3-4; Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers, Federal Regulation
of Securities Committee, American Bar Association, STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES AND THE WIL-
LIAMS ACT 5-6, reprinted in 32 Bus. LAW. 187, 189 (1976).
As of July 1, 1977, thirty states had adopted takeover acts, while several more are consider-
ing such legislation. The acts, their effective dates, and the states which have adopted them in-
clude: Alaska Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-20 (Supp. 1977) (effective
June 8, 1976); Arkansas Corporate Takeover Act (to be codified); Colorado Investor Protection
Act, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to 5-108 (Supp. 1976) (effective July 1, 1975); Connecticut
Tender Offer Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347(a) to 347(m) (West Supp. 1978) (effective
June 2, 1976); Delaware Tender Offer Act, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1976) (effective May 1,
1976); Georgia Corporate Takeover Statute, GA. CODE §§ 22-1901 to 1915 (1977) (effective March
23, 1977); Hawaii Take-Over Bids Law, HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to 15 (Supp. 1975) (effective
1975); Idaho Corporate Take-Over Law, IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 1513 (Supp. 1977) (effective
July 1, 1975); Indiana Business Take-Over Law, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3-1 to 12 (Burns Supp.
1977) (effective June 1, 1976); Kansas Take-Over Bids Law, KAN. STAT. §§ 17-1276 to 1285 (1974)
(effective July 1, 1974); Kentucky Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, KY. REV. STAT. §§ 292.560 to
991 (Supp. 1976) (effective July 1, 1976); Louisiana Business Take-Over Offers Act, LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 51:1500-1512 (West Supp. 1977) (effective June 28, 1976); Maryland Corporate Take-
Over Law, MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN.§§ 11-901 to 908 (Supp. 1977) (effective July 1, 1976);
Massachusetts Regulation of Take-Over Bids in the Acquisition of Corporations Law, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I 10C, §§ 1 to 13 (West Supp. 1978) (effective May 22, 1976); Michigan Take-
Over Offer Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-917 (Supp. 1978) (effective July 1, 1976);
Minnesota Corporate Take-Over Law, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01 to 13 (Supp. 1978) (effective
Aug. 1, 1974); Mississippi Business Takeover Law of 1977 (to be codified); Nebraska Takeover
Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-378 (1973) (effective 1969); Nevada Takeover Bid Disclosure
Law, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376 to 3778 (1973) (effective 1972); New Hampshire Takeover Act
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.A:2 VI (1977) (effective 1976) New Jersey Takeover Bid Disclosure
Law of 1977 (to be codified); New York Security Takeover Disclosure Act, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 1600-1613 (McKinney Supp. 1977-78) (effective Nov. 1, 1976); Ohio Take-Over Bids-Require-
ments, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1973) (effective Oct. 9, 1969); Pennsylvania
Takeover Disclosure Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1978) (effective March
3, 1976); South Dakota Corporate Take-Over Offers Law, S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to
47-32-47 (Supp. 1977) (effective 1975); Tennessee Investor Protection Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§
48-2101 to 2115 (Supp. 1977) (effective Mar. 17, 1976); Texas Administrative Guidelines for Mini-
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securities department. This statutory protection for management in-
volved in a tender contest contradicts the construction which many
courts have given to the Williams Act.84 These courts have applied the
state takeover acts principally to prevent attempts to freeze out minor-
ity shareholders. Although these statutes have been said to support
weak management,85shareholders have also used them to their bene-
fit.86 The main impact of such statutes has been to prevent what have
come to be known as "Saturday night specials,"' 87 where tender offers
are consummated within the minimum possible time under the Wil-
liams Act-as little as one week-and effectively deprive both manage-
ment and stockholders of the target company of the opportunity to
respond intelligently to a tender offer. Management was unable to dis-
charge its duties when confronted with such a "blitz offer," and share-
holders were being stampeded into accepting questionable or
inadequate offers because there was insufficient time to obtain a better
offer. Therefore, the states set out to draft their own protection, custom-
tailored to remedy defects that were perceived in the Williams Act. 8
The legitimacy of such statutes may be questionable on constitu-
tional grounds as a violation of the commerce clause8 9 or on grounds
that the statutes are preempted by the Williams Act.90 Recently a fed-
eral district court found such preemption of a state takeover statute in
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,9 where the Idaho takeover stat-
mum Standards in Tender Offers (to be codified); Utah Take-Over Disclosure Act, UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to 13 (1977 Supp.) (effective Feb. 5, 1976); Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act,
YA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 TO 541 (1973 & Supp. 1977) (effective Mar. 5, 1968); WISCONSIN CORPO-
RATE TAKE-OVER LAW, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West 1977) (effective July 1, 1972). Bills
in two other states, Florida and Illinois, were passed by the legislatures and were awaiting signa-
tures by governors.
84. See, e.g., cases cited, supra note 36.
85. Royalty, State Takeover Statutes and New Takeover Strategies-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW.
1459 (1977).
86. Id
87. Arsht, The Delaware Takeover Statute-Special Problemsfor Directors, 32 Bus. LAW.
1461 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Arsht, Delaware Takeover Statute]; Bartell, The Wisconsin Take-
over Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1466 (1977).
88. Arsht, Delaware Takeover Statute, supra note 87, at 1462.
89. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); seegeneral DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at
225-32; Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 15.
90. Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 23; DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS,
supra note 4, at 225-32.
91. 439 F. Supp. 420, 437 (N.D. Tex. 1977) held that:
There is a conflict of purpose between the Williams Act and the Idaho statute: the Wil-
liams Act regulates the making of tender offers for the benefit of shareholders, while the
Idaho statute regulates the making of tender offers primarily for the benefit of the man-
agement of the target company. By weighing the scales so heavily in favor of manage-
ment of target companies, the Idaho statute has destroyed the delicate balance reached
[Vol. 13:552
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ute was said to conflict with the clear purpose of the Williams Act.
Nevertheless, these conflicts can easily be avoided by the passage of a
mild take-over regulation statute which does not cal for burdensome
disclosure beyond that already required by the Williams Act. Delaware
has recently passed the mildest of all state takeover statutes; 92 the Dela-
ware Act is a notice-type statute.93 It does not provide for a hearing by
any state administrative agency, nor is there even a required filing of
the proposed tender offer with a state office. Delaware eliminates the
possibility of a "Saturday night special" by requiring that the tender
offer remain open for a period of at least twenty days after it is made to
the holders of the equity securities, during which period any stock-
holder may withdraw any of the securities tendered to the offeror.94
Further, a written statement of the offeror's intention to make the
tender offer must be delivered to the corporation at its registered of-
fice.95 Such provisions indicate a strong legislative intent to give corpo-
rate directors time to react intelligently to a proposed tender offer
without narrowly limiting the scope of the protection to the prevention
of minority shareholder squeezeouts. The directors should use the time
provided to do what is in the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.
The state takeover statutes' most obvious effect is delay, particular-
ly if a state securities commission hearing is required. Although a state
securities commission may ultimately approve the tender offer, the tar-
get company will have succeeded in eliminating the offeror's critical
advantages of surprise and speed. This may be illustrated by the Indi-
ana takeover statute96 which requires that a hearing be held within
twenty days of the hearing order (which can be issued within twenty
days of filing by the offeror), and that a determination must be made
within sixty days of the hearing's conclusion. Therefore, a target com-
pany could conceivably delay the tender offer by approximately three
and one-half months simply by requesting a hearing.97 The target com-
pany may exercise this option in the hope of causing the tender offer to
by the Williams Act. Because of the conffict that exists, this court is of the opinion that
the Idaho takeover statute is preempted by the Williams Act.
See also Comment, State Takeover Statutes Versus Congressional Intent: Preempting the Maze, 5
HOFSTRA L. REV. 857, 860 (1977).
92. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1976).
93. Arsht, Delaware Takeover Statute, supra note 87, at 1462.
94. Id; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (1976).
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 8, § 203(a)(1) (1976).
96. IND. CODE §§ 23-2-3-2(e), (f) (Bums Supp. 1977).
97. Id. Substantial delays are not unusual. See, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. I 10C, §§ 6-7
(West Supp. 1978) (150 days); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(b)(4) (1975) (100 days).
1978]
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die a natural death, or as a delaying tactic to gain time to develop a
defense to the tender offer.98 This gives a target company a very effec-
tive parry, stalling for time, and allows market forces to make it eco-
nomically undesirable for shareholders to relinquish their securities. 99
Such delay can also increase the likelihood of wide price fluctuations in
the target company's stock. Sufficient fluctuations in the market some-
times cause the SEC to halt trading in the target security between the
time the offer is filed and when it is published. 1° Thus, uncertainty and
conflict among the provisions of present takeover statutes have already
caused delays, price fluctuations, and possible suspensions of trading.
The enactment of takeover statutes by more states may well impede the
SEC's control and supervision of the market, and increase the uncer-
tainty of shareholders. 10 1 This uncertainty generated by the state stat-
utes is most easily demonstrated by a review of a few recent cases
which have applied the statutes.
Prior to 1975, only one unfriendly tender offer had been substan-
tially delayed because of a state takeover statute.' 0 2 But now, the of-
98. Once a tender offer is underway, a target company may use a number of defensive meas-
ures to block the takeover. The target may buy its own stock to raise the market price, declare an
inflated dividend, merge with a friendly corporation, or solicit allied corporations to purchase its
securities. The target may also attack the tender offer on antitrust grounds. See, e.g., Muskegon
Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf& W. Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1964); Boyertown Burial Casket
Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F.Supp. 811 (E.D.Pa. 1976); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 362
F.Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), modified [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,108
(S.D.N.Y.), af'd in part and rei'd in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973). The offer may also be
challenged on the ground of nonconformity with other applicable regulatory statutes. See
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 322
(1967). Indeed, potential antitrust problems may be arranged at the last moment by a potential
target. See, e.g., Ruthlessness by the Rules, 117 FORBES 24, 26-27 (Feb. 1, 1976).
99. Ruthlessness by the Rules, 117 FoRBES 24, 28 (Feb. 1, 1976) (urges statutory delays);
Robinson, Tender Offers: Some Facts and Fancies, 175 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1976). Such delay time may be
used advantageously by target company management, since public announcement of a tender
offer will stimulate open-market purchase of the target's securities by present shareholders or spec-
ulators expecting to realize a quick profit on their short term investment. See E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 173-91 (1973). Indeed, arbitrageurs may
have a decisive role in the success of tender offers. See Ruthlessness by the Rules, id at 25. Active
trading will raise the price of the target's securities, and, as the market price draws closer to the
tender offer price, the economic incentive for shareholders to sell their stock fades. See WALL ST.
J., Aug. 20, 1968, at 32, col. I. As a result, when the margin narrows between the market and
tender offer prices, shareholders may be more receptive to management's appeals not to sell and to
support the status quo through a combination of loyalty and lack of economic incentive. See
Comment, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 So. CAL. L.
REV. 1133 (1974).
100. A New York Stock Exchange Review of the Ohio Takeover Statute, as summarized in
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 1, at A-12 (June 4, 1969).
101. See Comment, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation o/Tender Offers, 47
So. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974).
102. See Zn Re E Z Painter Corp. & Newell Cos., Inc., [1973] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
71,063, where an offer was first filed in Wisconsin on December 5, 1972. After a review and five
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feror in a tender contest must be concerned with one or more state
takeover statutes which may have an adverse delaying effect upon the
offer.1"3 In Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal,"4 the shareholders of Cop-
perweld, a Pittsburgh-based producer of specialty steel, were tendered
an offer for their shares by Societe Imetal, a French concern. Cop-
perweld was not required to be licensed to do business in Ohio merely
because of its ownership of shares in two Ohio corporations, nor be-
cause it was the owner of operating assets in Ohio." 5 Although it did
have two Ohio subsidiaries, approximately a year after their incorpora-
tion Copperweld itself surrendered its license to transact business as a
foreign corporation in Ohio.
At the time the tender offer was made by Imetal, Copperweld
"fought hard to stave off a takeover. . . [;] Copperweld executives op-
posed the bid in court, [and] employees staged placard-waving demon-
strations pleading that the company stay American-owned." 0 6 But the
Ohio takeover statute was by far the strongest weapon the target had,
and the statute was used to obtain considerable delays.
The Ohio takeover statute covers tender offers for a company
which has either incorporated in Ohio or has its principal place of busi-
ness in Ohio, and which has substantial assets within Ohio.10 7 There-
fore, it can be argued that the statute was inapplicable in this case, since
the target company, Copperweld, was not incorporated in Ohio nor
had its principal place of business nor substantial assets in the state.
Even so, the attorney general of Ohio sued to enjoin Societe Imetal
from pursuing its tender offer until it complied with the Ohio statute.'08
days of hearings before the Commissioner of Securities, the offer became effective on January 30,
1973. The offer, though opposed by the target company, was ultimately registered and effective.
103. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Seegenerally Otis Eleva-
tor Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wysocki, The Delaying
Game, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
104. 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
105. See e.g., Golden Dawn Foods, Inc. v. Cekuta, I Ohio App. 2d 464, -- 205 N.E.2d 121,
123-24 (1964).
106. Takeovers Applying "Unfriendly" Persuasion, TIME, Dec. 15, 1975, at 58.
107. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1976). This Ohio Act is designed
"to protect [all] shareholders [wherever located] of Ohio and Ohio-based corporations by requir-
ing public announcement and fair, full, and effective disclosures to shareholders in regard to take-
over bids." See Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio
Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 722, 740 (1970); see also Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill,
43 OHIo BAR J. 65 (1970).
108. Suit was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio v. Imetal, No. 75 Civ. 09-3868
(C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 9, 1975). At the time this suit was instituted, a suit based upon
federal law was being litigated in the Federal District Court in Pittsburgh. Copperweld Corp. v.
Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Although Societe Imetal was successful in the federal
case, the tender offer was delayed pending the adjudication of the Ohio suit.
1978)
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Copperweld was able to invoke Ohio's jurisdiction because the com-
pany's substantial assets and operations of its two subsidiaries were
considered tantamount to the principal place of business of the par-
ent. 109
In a similar case where a state statute was asserted to delay a
tender offer, Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 10 applied
the Indiana takeover statute. United Technologies Corp. made a tender
offer for fifty-five percent of the shares of Otis Elevator Company, a
New Jersey corporation, after Otis had filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. The motion alleged violations of the Williams Act,
namely, failure to disclose the plan of merger."' The Indiana takeover
statute was invoked because a "substantial portion of the total assets"
of United was located in the state. 1 2 Numerous motions and orders
were pursued in state and federal courts in Indiana, 1 3 but the applica-
bility and constitutionality of the Indiana statute had still not been ad-
judicated, and eventually, United announced termination of its offer
and its intent to make a new offer at a higher price."14
In another case illustrating the impact of the Ohio state tender of-
fer statutes, In re Thrall Car Mfg. Co., The Youngstown Steel Door
Co.," ' Thrall made a tender offer for Youngstown and was defeated.
Thrall's proposed offer was for fifty-two percent of Youngstown's stock
at a thirty percent premium over the market price of the shares. Thrall
filed information with the Ohio Division of Securities as required by
the Ohio statute, but the next day, Youngstown's management re-
109. This argument was apparently based upon a test set forth in Kelly v. United States Steel
Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960). However, in Kelly, the issue was location of defendant's
principal place of business, and the court resolved the question by looking to the place where most
executive decisions were made. The court did not mention the existence or location of subsidiaries.
110. 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(l)(C) (1976).
112. 405 F. Supp. at 960. Under the Indiana statute, "substantial assets" within the state pro-
vide a sufficient jurisdictional basis. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-10) (Supp. 1976).
113. These motions and orders included: (I) a dease and desist order by the Indiana Securities
Commissioner, (2) a lawsuit commenced by Otis in state court resulting in a temporary restraining
order, (3) an action by United in the federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the
Indiana statute, (4) a subsequent ruling by the Indiana Securities Commissioner dissolving the
cease and desist order on the ground that the statute did not apply to Otis, (5) an action by Otis in
state court to review the Commissioner's ruling, (6) the expiration of the state court's temporary
restraining order, (7) United's removal of all state court proceedings to the federal district court in
Indianapolis, and (8) the remand of Otis' action to the state court to review the Commissioner's
ruling.
114. Troubh, Purchased Affection:A Primer on Cash Tender Offers, 1976 HARV. Bus. REV. 79,
82-83 (July-Aug.).
115. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Division of Securities, File No. 041-10 (Aug. 2, 1976); see also
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at 222-25, 254-55.
[Vol. 13:552
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quested that the Division of Securities hold a hearing to investigate the
offer. The hearing lasted nearly a month. Finally, sixty days after
Thrall had filed its proposals with the division, and on the last day
permitted by statute, the Division of Securities issued its order." 6 The
Division found that the offeror's ten-day limit was "inherently unfair"
to shareholders, that the price offered for the Youngstown shares was
inadequate because it bore "no relationship to the intrinsic value of the
[Youngstown] stock,""' 7 and that the offer had not been shown to be
fair and equitable."'
The disclosures made by Thrall were also found to be deficient for
several reasons, and based upon those findings the Division of Securi-
ties ruled that the tender offer violated the Ohio tender offer statute." 9
The Ohio Commissioner of Securities informed Thrall that proposed
amendments to its offer should be submitted to Youngstown for com-
ment, and that hearings would be held to determine whether the
amended offer complied with the Division's order. Thrall then filed suit
in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio seeking
a declaratory judgment that the Ohio tender offer statute was unconsti-
tutional and an injunction restraining enforcement of the statute in
connection with Thrall's tender offer.
Twenty-five days after the Commission issued its order against
Thrall's tender offer, the management of Youngstown received an an-
nouncement of another tender offer for 55.8 percent of its shares from
Lamson & Sessions Company, at a price slightly higher than that of-
fered by Thrall. However, Lamson gave Youngstown a shorter period
of time within which to tender the shares. Since the second tender offer
was supported by the management of Youngstown, it was exempt from
regulation by the Ohio Division of Securities and was allowed to be-
come effective, 120 despite the fact that it contained a number of the
same deficiencies that were found in the Thrall offer. Ultimately, Lam-
son & Sessions Co. purchased ninety-two percent of the Youngstown
shares, making futile any attempt by Thrall to continue with its own




120. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1)(d) (Supp. 1976) stating that a takeover bid
does not include
[any tender offer or request or invitation for tender to which the target company con-
sents, by action of its board of directors, if such board of directors has recommended
acceptance thereof to shareholders and the terms thereof, including any inducements to
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proposed offer. 121
Although the offerors in Imetal'2 2 and United Technologies123
were both eventually successful in their takeover efforts, they illustrate,
as does Youngstown SeelDoor,124 the practical effects of the state stat-
utes' elimination of secrecy and speed, two traditional virtures of the
tender offer technique of acquiring corporate control. 125 As these three
cases illustrate, state takeover statutes remain unclear in their applica-
tion and effect; yet they operate as a strong deterrent to potential offer-
ors126 and protect management from unwanted takeover bids. Another
obvious effect is the delay that occurs, particularly if a state agency
hearing procedure is invoked. Such delay may result in upward price
fluctuations in the shares of the target company. Consequently, poten-
tial offerors are hindered in their takeover attempts, and the target re-
mains protected from unwanted acquisition attempts.
As states continue to enact more restrictive takeover statutes, the
use of this technique to acquire a company will become less attrac-
tive. 127 Eventually, the tender offer tactic may become useless, as an of-
feror may be forced to comply with the most restrictive of the state acts
to avoid injunctions and other penalties. 128
121. A similar result occurred in the tender offer by Bethlehem Copper Corp. for Valley
Camp Coal Co. See Quaker State Oiland ValleyAgree on Merger, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1976, at 2,
col. 2; Bethlehem Copper Drops Valley Camp Tender Offer, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 13, 1976, at 37, col.
4.
122. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 404 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
123. Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
124. In Re Thrall Car Mfg. Co., The Youngstown Steel Door Co., Ohio Dept. of Commerce,
Division of Securities, File No. 041-10 (Aug. 2, 1976).
125. When a delay is obtained, more options become available to the target. In a recent bid
delayed by the Ohio procedure, Microdot, Inc. was able to arrange a friendly merger with a third
party at $21 per share while the tender offer of General Cable at $17 per share was still in court.
N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 1976, at 42, col. 4. Similarly, a target has greater opportunity to mount a
propaganda campaign of its own against the offeror's motives and abilities. See e.g., N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 1976, at 53, Col. 1-2; advt., id at 57 (campaign in opposition to exchange offer, which was
required to be announced before its effective date).
126. N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1976 at 42, col. 4.
127. See e.g., WALL ST. J., March 18, 1976, at 26, col. 2, where it is stated that the tender
"[o]ffer is not being made to. . .holders of [s]hares in any jurisdiction of the United States. . . in
which the [o]ffer or the acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities laws of
such jurisdiction." Cf. WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1975, at 33, col. 2 (an offeror gave its opinion, as part
of advertised offering information, that the Indiana takeover statute was inapplicable to the offer);
see also N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 1976, at 42, col. 4.
128. Some acts, indeed, purport to apply even where an offeror makes some kind of dis-
claimer. For example, the Ohio act was criticized in testimony before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs by SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, Jr. The Commis-
sioner said in essence that the statute seemed "designed to prevent an offer from being made
outside of Ohio unless and until the Ohio Act has been complied with if there are shareholders in
Ohio." [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 630 (Feb. 25, 1976). See also, e.g. the Indiana act,
which provides that "[a]n offeror may not make a take-over offer involving a target company
23
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In addition, the application of state takeover statutes creates a
myriad of constitutional problems relating to the overlapping of the
state statutes with the federal legislation in the area.129 When constru-
ing a state takeover statute, courts must now consider whether the stat-
ute is in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution,
and whether the Williams Act has preempted the states' authority to
regulate the area.
130
IV. FUTURE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS:
THE SEC TENDER OFFER RULES
Tender offer regulation has been developing with a common aim
to provide the target company advance notice of the proposed offer and
to require the bidder to make additional disclosures.13 1
The SEC's proposed tender offer rules, published in the summer of
1976,132 take into consideration the original purpose of the Williams
Act to require full and fair disclosure of material information not only
for the benefit of shareholders, but also for the benefit of the bidder and
the target.' 33 Although recent cases appear to apply the Williams Act
only in favor of minority shareholders,1 34 the SEC proposals hopefully
will re-establish a balance of protection, as well as result in additional
which is not made to the owners of equity securities of the target company who are residents of
this state." IND. CODE § 23-2-3-5(e) (Supp. 1976).
129. See Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 15-25; accord, Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (applying a legitimate local public interest test to state statutes which
affect interstate commerce). See also DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS, supra note 4, at xix,
232-33, stating that state tender offer statutes "are an unfortunate step backward in the orderly
development of the federal securities laws."
130. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977); see also
Wilner & Landy, Tender Trap, supra note 3, at 23.
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976) (This act, entitled the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1976, places certain filing requirements, waiting periods and notice requirements in
the premerger stages of a tender offer contest); see also State Takeover Statutes, cited at note 83
supra.
132. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to 14d-101 (1977); Appelton, The Proposed SEC Tender Of-
fer Rules-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1382 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Appelton, Proposed
Rulesj.
133. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-I to 14d-101 (1977). The SEC also plans to regulate a com-
pany's purchase of its own shares. Such rules would parallel the proposed SEC regulations of
offers for the stock of another company. The proposal includes the following requirements: (1) a
tender offer would have to remain open for at least fifteen business days; (2) a shareholder tender-
ing his stock would have the right to withdraw within the first ten business days after the offer is
announced and after forty business days following the announcement; (3) and officers, directors
and major shareholders of the offering company would have to disclose all of their transactions in
the company's stock during the forty business days before the purchase offer. See WALL. ST. J.,
Dec. 9, 1977, at 5, col. 1.
134. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505
(Mass. 1975); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del, 1977).
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disclosures, adequate communications to shareholders, and a longer
time in which to evaluate the tender offer. Such improvements would
benefit shareholders, management, and investors alike. The proposals
contain important changes, including:
(1) Communication of a cash tender offer by full advertisement
or mailing to shareholders. 135
(2) Notice to shareholders of the tender offer bid in the form of a
direct mail communication to all shareholders whose identity is avail-
able to the bidder. 136
(3) As to past relationships, transactions or negotiations with the
target company during the three-year period prior to the tender offer,
new disclosures are required which are intended to further the purposes
of the Williams Act. This may include disclosure of conflicts of interest
and disclosure of the nature and approximate dollar amount of busi-
ness relationships, including transactions between bidder and the target
company or its affiliates, plus a description of contacts, relationships,
transactions or negotiations between such persons concerning a merger
or consolidation with, or acquisition of, the target or any of its subsidi-
aries. Such disclosures apply to a tender offer for, or acquisition of, the
target or any of its subsidiaries; a tender offer for, or other acquisition
of, securities of the target; an election of directors of the target; and the
sale or other transfer of a material amount of assets by the target or any
of its subsidiaries. 137
(4) Disclosures concerning the source and amount of funds or
other consideration to be used by the bidder in the tender offer are to
be increased. 138 This would require disclosure of material terms and
conditions of any loan agreements if any part of the funds or other
consideration is to be borrowed, directly or indirectly, as well as a
description of any plans or arrangements to finance or repay such
loans.
(5) Disclosure is to be required whether control of the target
company is sought or not. This would require disclosure of a bidder's
plan regarding any extraordinary corporate transaction involving the
target or any of its subsidiaries such as: a sale or transfer of a material
amount of the assets of the target or any of its subsidiaries; changes in
the present board of directors or management; material change in the
present capitalization, dividend policy, business or corporate structure;
135. Appelton, ProposedRules, supra note 132, at 1383.
136. Id.
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and delisting of a class of securities from a national securities exchange
or termination of the registration of a class of securities. 3 9 Such disclo-
sures will apply not only to bidders but also to any executive officer,
director, affiliate or subsidiary of such person.
(6) A materiality test is to be applied to determine whether an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed of such in-
formation in deciding whether to sell, tender, or hold the securities be-
ing sought. 140
V. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the decisions in Piter v. Chris Craft Industries,
Singer v. Magnavox Company, and Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
wherein the courts construed the main purpose behind the Securities
and Exchange Act to be the protection of minority shareholders from
squeezeouts by tender offerors, and with the increasing number of state
and federal regulations of tender offer takeover bids, the tender offer
may soon become extinct as a form of corporate takeover. One of the
easiest ways to restrict the use of a certain procedure is to make compli-
ance with the rules and regulations controlling such a procedure so
complex and confusing that the average company will choose another
alternative to avoid the threat of litigation or the expense of compli-
ance. What was once the most convenient and expeditious method of
acquiring another company is now fraught with uncertainties. The va-
lidity of the sale is subject to question by federal law, state statutes,
inconsistent court decisions, and SEC rules.
Congress must clarify which groups of persons are to be given
standing to bring suits under the Williams Act and provide corrective
legislation to insure that enforcement is accomplished uniformly and in
a manner calculated to effectuate the original purposes of the Act. If
partial or total frustration of the federal laws is to be avoided, the SEC
and its state counterparts must cooperate to assure more coordination
and less conflict in the interpretation and administration of tender offer
regulation. If these ends are not accomplished, Congress should pass
legislation, expressly following the district court decision in Great West-
ern United Corp. v. Kidwell, to preempt conflicting state regulation of
tender offers. Such legislation will prevent increasing litigation con-
cerning tender offer regulation and dispell some of the mounting hesi-
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